We give a non-cooperative and an axiomatic characterization of the Average Lexicographic value (AL-value) on the class of balanced games. The AL-value is a single-valued solution for balanced TUgames. It is defined as the average of lexicographic maximum of the core of the game with respect to all orders on the player set, and it can be seen as a core selection based on the priority orders on the * Corresponding author.
Introduction
The core (Gillies 1953 ) is a central solution concept in cooperative game theory. If an allocation belongs to the core, no coalition has an incentive to deviate from it; thus, it is coalitionally stable. It goes without saying that the stability is very important in allocation problems; however if there are multiple core allocations, the question "how to select one of them?" arises. One of the well-known core selection is the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969) , which is a lexicographic center of the core (see Maschler et al. 1979) .
Recently, González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2007) have introduced the core-center, which is a mathematical expectation of the uniform distribution defined over the core.
In some economic situations where there are multiple agents and they negotiate how to divide the outcome obtained by their cooperation, the agents may fix a priority order among them and, following the priority, agents request the best outcome among the remaining ones. For example, the runto-the-bank rule in bankruptcy problems (O'Neill 1982) and the serial dictatorship rule in house allocation problems (Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979 and Svensson 1994) . The Average Lexicographic value (henceforth, AL-value, Tijs 2005 and Branzei et al. 2008 ) is a one-point solution for cooperative game theory which reflects the use of priority orders. By definition, the ALvalue is the weighted average of some vertices of the core (more precisely, the weighted average of vertices obtained as leximals with respect to some orders for the set of players), and it is different from the above mentioned two core selections.
1
In this paper, we characterize the AL-value in both non-cooperative and axiomatic approaches. In both characterizations a consistency property which we call average consistency property of the AL-value plays a key role. It is obtained by the fact that leximals satisfy consistencyà la Davis and Maschler (1965) . Our results are closely related to existing non-cooperative and axiomatic characterizations of the well-known one-point solution the Shapley value (Shapley 1953) . Similarities and differences between the ALvalue and the Shapley value are well-captured by them.
In the non-cooperative approach, given a cooperative game, we construct a non-cooperative game in which the AL-value is obtained as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium payoff. Our non-cooperative game is inspired by the bidding mechanism of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), however we focus more on the core property of the outcome. The differences between our non-cooperative game and the bidding mechanism lie in the game played by the remaining players when a proposer's offer is rejected. In the bidding mechanism the game is based on the restricted game defined on the set of the remaining players, whereas in our non-cooperative game, the game is defined based on the Davis and Maschler's reduced game with respect to the proposer's most desirable core allocation. By assuming the existence of the core and thus the formation of the grand coalition, our approach corresponds to remaining players' behaviors based on their pessimistic outlook for the division after a player obtains an advantageous position, a proposer.
Our non-cooperative game can be seen as a bargaining based on core allocations among players and it works well in "verifiable" environment (see Ju and Wettstein 2009) . To the best of our knowledge, the non-cooperative foundations of the other core selections such as the nucleolus and the core-center are limited in the literature. For the nucleolus, Serrano (1993) mentions a non-cooperative implementation of it for 3-person super-additive games and Montero (2006) provides a non-cooperative interpretation of it for proper simple games. There are no non-cooperative foundations of the core-center.
In the axiomatic approach, we give some variations of the balanced contributions property of Myerson (1980) . As mentioned in Kamijo and Kongo (2009), Myerson' s balanced contributions property is rather a restrictive one.
Hence, first we consider a weaker version of Myerson's balanced contributions property. We call the new property the balanced average contributions property and we show that this new property also characterizes the Shapley value as Myerson (1980) did. Then, we consider two new properties which are based on the special reduced game of Davis and Maschler (1965) : the balanced DMcontributions property and the balanced average DM-contributions property.
Unlike the case of the Shapley value, only the latter property characterizes the AL-value and there is no efficient value that satisfies the former property.
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives preliminaries. Section 3 provides a consistency property of leximals and an average consistency property of the AL-value. Section 4 gives a set of non-cooperative games, in which the AL-value is obtained in any subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 5 presents an axiomatic characterization of the AL-value. Section 6 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair (N, v) , where N ⊂ N is a finite set of players with n = |N |, and v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function on 2 
The very basic solution concept of this paper is the core given (cf. Gillies
1953) by
A game with a non-empty core is called a balanced game and the set of all balanced games is denoted by G C . Then, we denote the set of balanced games with player set
Let (N, v) ∈ G N C and let Π(N ) be the set of all orders on N , that is, one to one onto mappings from {1, 2, ..., n} to N . We also denote σ =
is the lexicographic maximum of the core of (N, v) with respect to the ordering σ. In the sequel, we refer to each L σ (N, v) , σ ∈ Π(N ), as the leximal of v with respect to σ, whereas we refer to L σ as the leximal (operator) with respect to σ.
The AL-value, defined by Tijs (2005) (see also Branzei et al. 2008) as the average of the leximals, is a solution concept on the domain G N C , which is uniquely determined by the core. The AL-value is the function AL :
On special classes of balanced games the AL-value coincides with specific solutions on those classes (for details, see Branzei et al. 2008 , Lohmann 2006 , and Lohmann et al. 2007 . In this paper we refer to its relations with the 
Then the Shapley value ϕ(N, v) 
Some basic differences between the marginal worth vectors of a balanced game and its leximals on the one hand, and between the Shapley value of such game and its AL-value on the other hand deserve to be mentioned here. Whereas a marginal worth vector of a balanced game might not be a core allocation of the game, each leximal is an extreme point of the core.
Furthermore, whereas the Shapley value of a balanced game might not belong to the core of the game (even it might not be an imputation), the AL-value is a selection of the core. Moreover, the property of invariance with respect to exactification (proved for the AL-value in Branzei et al. 2008 ) and the average consistency property with respect to the core (which we prove for the AL-value in Section 3) are not satisfied by the Shapley value on the class of balanced games. We notice that for real life applications balanced games and their cores are of particular interest, because if the core of the game is the empty set the grand coalition might not form. Finally, we point out that the marginals and the Shapley value are defined for arbitrary cooperative games, whereas the leximals and the AL-value are defined only for balanced games.
The class of convex games is an important subclass of balanced games on which the Shapley value and the AL-value coincide (see Branzei et al. 2008 ).
Recall that a game (N, v) ∈ G is convex if
Average consistency of the AL-value
Our goal in this section is to prove an average consistency property of the AL-value. To do this, we first need to study a consistency property of the leximals operators. We use notations N \ j instead of N \ {j} hereafter.
Consistency with respect to a reduced game is one of the very important properties of solutions of a game, which requires the coincidence of the payoffs in the original game and its reduced game. Peleg (1986) shows that the core satisfies consistency with respect to the reduced gameà la Davis and Maschler. Núñez and Rafels (1998) show that each extreme point of the core satisfies the same consistency property.
Since each leximal is one of the extreme points of the core, the payoffs of the leximal of the original game coincide with the payoffs of an extreme point of the core of the reduced game. However, the payoffs of the leximal of the original game might not be equal to the payoffs of the leximal of the reduced game. More precisely, we have to show the coincidence of the payoffs of a leximal with respect to an order σ of the players in the original game with the payoffs of the leximal with respect to an induced order from order σ in the reduced gameà la Davis and Maschler.
The reduced gameà la Davis and Maschler, in short the DM-reduced game , v) and j ∈ N , defined (cf. Davis and Maschler 1965) by
Next, we will show the consistency of the leximals with respect to the reduced game. To prove this, following Caprari et al. (2006), we define a
For any subset S ⊂ N and any order σ ∈ Π(N ), take T ⊂ {1, 2, ..., n}
We also denote the set of such functions bỹ Π(S). Then σ S is not in Π(S), but it induces a natural order on S. Let
for i ∈ σ −1 (S) and for any compact convex set K S ∈ K S . We also denote
and σ S by σ if there is no confusion. For leximals, we also use a similar notation, that is, for any σ ∈ Π(N ), any S ⊂ N , and any game
Then we obtain the following.
belongs to G C , and
Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that N = {1, 2, ..., n}. Take
First, we consider the case when i < l. Let i = 1; then
where the last equality holds because y belongs to C (N, v) .
Then, we have
Further, by (1) we obtain,
This implies that
Second, consider the case when i > l. Based on the fact that
Next, we cope with a consistency property of the AL-value which we call the average consistency of the AL-value with respect to the core. We consider a special type of reduced games. Let k ∈ N and let σ k ∈ Π(N ) be an order which satisfies σ k (1) = k. We denote the set of such orders by Π k (N ). We
We can consider the reduced gameà la Davis and Maschler with respect
We call the above game the lexicographically DM reduced game with respect to k ∈ N . This game reflects remaining players' pessimistic outlook. Now, given a balanced game (N, v), we assume the grand coalition N is formed and consider the division of the worth v(N ) among players in N , based on the characteristic function v. Then, players are not able to obtain any imputation that is not an element of the core of the game (N, v) . This is because, for such an imputation, there exists a coalition that is willing to deviate from the grand coalition N , in the hope of getting more among them, and thus it conflicts the assumption that N is formed. In this sense, we consider the division of v(N ) as a selection among all core allocations of (N, v). Further, assume that one of the players, k, obtains an advantageous position among all players.
3 A coalition S of remaining players N \k reconsiders the situation in the following manner: First, S can obtain the worth v(S) by only themselves.
In addition, they are able to win the cooperation with k if they offer k's maximal payoff among core allocation, z k , to k. Therefore, the worth of S is
average consistency with respect to the core if and only if for any i ∈ N ,
Theorem 1 easily implies the following theorem. Caprari et al. (2008) also consider the average consistency of the AL-value for share sets, but not for TU games. Though TU games are related to share sets, the relationship between the reduced gamesà la 
Proof. For any k ∈ N and i ∈ N \ k,
) .
Proof. By the consistency property of the leximals, we have
Then, we have (N,v) ).
We plug this into Theorem 2.
Non-cooperative characterization of the ALvalue
In this section, we develop a non-cooperative characterization of the ALvalue.
Given a TU-game (N, v) ∈ G C , the non-cooperative game Γ(N, v) is defined in the following recursive manner.
In the case |N | = 1, player i ∈ N obtains v({i}) and the game is over.
Assume that the non-cooperative game is known when there are less than n players. We consider the non-cooperative game where there are n players.
t=1 Each player i ∈ N makes bids b i j ∈ R for every player j ̸ = i.
For each i ∈ N , the net bid B i is the sum of the bids he made minus the sum of the bids the others made to him, that is, t=2 Player α makes an offer x j ∈ R to every player j ∈ N \α.
t=3 Players in N \α respond to the proposer's offer in a sequential manner, say (j 1 , . . . , j n−1 ). An ordering of the players makes no matter.
Response is either "accept it" or "reject it".
In the case player j h accepts the offer, the next player j h+1 responds to it. If every j h accepts the offer, the players come to an agreement. If there is some rejection, an agreement is not reached.
When an agreement is reached, proposer α pays the proposed payoff This non-cooperative game is inspired by the bidding mechanism presented in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001). The differences between our non-cooperative game and the bidding mechanism lie in the treatment of the players in the case of rejection at t=3. In our non-cooperative game, the rejected proposer obtains his maximal payoff among core allocations and the remaining players play the non-cooperative game defined on the lexicographically DM-reduced game (N \ α, v −α ). On the other hand, in the bidding mechanism, the rejected proposer obtains the worth of his stand-alone coalition and the remaining players play the non-cooperative game defined on the
Note that in our non-cooperative game, the "designer" of the non-cooperative game does not have to get information on the value z i for every i ∈ N , in advance, but has to have a chance to obtain it. For the designer, the information on z i is needed only when someone rejects the offer from i. In Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001)'s bidding mechanism produces the Shapley value payoff for any zero-monotonic game in any subgame perfect equilibrium. That is, for any zero-monotonic game, players share the worth of grand coalition as equilibrium outcomes. However, if the outcome of the mechanism, the Shapley value of the original zero-monotonic game, is not an element of the core of the game, players may fail to form the grand coalition.
By assuming the existence of the core (and that players form the grand coalition), our non-cooperative game can be seen as a bargaining based on core allocations. It produces the AL-value payoff for any balanced game in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Theorem 3. The non-cooperative game Γ(N, v) produces the AL-value payoff
for (N, v) ∈ G C in any subgame perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The proof proceeds by induction with respect to the number of players. If |N | = 1, the AL-value is equal to the value of the stand-alone coalition;
hence, the theorem holds. Assume that the theorem holds in the case there are less than n players and consider the case when there are n players.
First, we show that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium (hereafter, SPE) whose payoff coincides with the AL-value of the game (N, v). Consider the following strategy for each player. If all players take the above strategies, an agreement is formed at t=3 and the game is over. It is clear that the above strategy profile yields the AL-value for any player who is not the proposer α since b v) . Note that each player obtains his AL-value whether or not the player is the proposer. In other words, given the strategies an outcome is the same regardless of whom is chosen as the proposer.
To check whether the above strategies constitute an SPE, first, we show that the strategies at t=3 are best responses for each of the players. Let j n−1 be the last player who has to decide whether to accept or reject the offer.
If no other players reject an offer, player j n−1 's best response is to accept the offer if
−α ) and reject it otherwise. 5 Knowing the above mentioned reaction of the last player, the second last player j n−2 's best response is to accept the offer if x j n−2 ≥ AL j n−2 (N \α, v −α ) and reject it otherwise. Using the same argument when going backward, we can show that the strategies mentioned above constitute an SPE of the subgame starting from t=3.
Next, we prove that the strategies at t=2 are best responses for each of them. By the strategies, the proposer incrementally obtains If he offers some player j a valuex j larger than AL j (N \α, v −α ) without lowering the offer to the other players, the offer is accepted but the share of the proposer is strictly worse off. Thus, the above mentioned strategies constitute an SPE of the subgame starting from t=2.
It remains to show that the strategies at t=1 are best responses for each of the players. Given the strategies, for any i ∈ N ,
where the last equality holds by Theorem 2. Hence, all players can be chosen to be the proposer with probability 1 n . As seen before, the outcome is the same regardless of whom is chosen as the proposer. Given the above mentioned strategies, consider the case when player i changes his strategy tō
is not chosen as the proposer; hence, his final payoff is unchanged. If ∑ j̸ =i a j = 0, i may be chosen to be the proposer; in the case when he is not chosen as the proposer his final payoff is unchanged; in the case when he is chosen as the proposer his final payoff is
which means that his final payoff is also unchanged. If ∑ j̸ =i a j > 0, i must be chosen to be the proposer. However, by the previous result, he obtains
Thus, his share is strictly worse off. Therefore, the above mentioned strategies constitute an SPE.
Next, we prove, by the following series of claims, that in any SPE the AL-value payoff is obtained. 
By the fact that the offer is accepted, the sum of the payoffs of all players is v(N ), and thus, we obtain the desired result.
Claim 2: In any SPE, 
It means that Ω does not change. However, without affecting the probability of winning, i can decrease the sum of his payments in the case he wins since ∑
Claim 3: In any SPE each player's payoff is the same regardless of whom is chosen as the proposer.
By Claim 2, B i are the same for any i ∈ N . If some player increases his payoff by being chosen as the proposer, he should slightly increase one of his bids. Similarly, if some player increases his payoff when another player being chosen as the proposer, he should slightly decrease his bid to the player.
Claim 2 implies that, in any SPE, there are no players who have such incentives.
Claim 4:
In any SPE the final payoff coincides with the AL-value.
Let u j i be the player i's equilibrium payoff when the proposer is j at t=1.
By Claim 1,
and for each j ̸ = i,
By Claim 2, the above equality is equivalent to
By Theorem 2, the right-hand side of the above equality coincides with
Axiomatic characterization of the AL-value
In this section, we present an axiomatic characterization of the AL-value. As we mentioned before, the AL and Shapley values are closely related. Thus, we start with recalling some relevant axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value.
Let G be a class of all games. The following axiom is the basic one.
The next axiom is introduced in Myerson (1980) .
Balanced contributions property:
For each (N, v) ∈ G and any {i, j} ⊆ N ,
where (N \k, v| N \k ) is a restricted game on N \k with v| N \k : 2
In the above property, for any pair of players, a contribution from one player to another is balanced with that from another player to the player.
Further, rearranging the above equation, we have that i's value minus j's value in the original game is equal to i's value in the game in which j is deleted minus j's value in the game in which i is deleted. Hence, it can be interpreted as the difference between two players' values is unchanged whether or not the other player exists. Myerson (1980) characterizes the Shapley value by the above two axioms.
Theorem 4 (Myerson 1980) . The Shapley value is the unique value on G which satisfies Balanced contributions property and Efficiency.
Following the above result, Kamijo and Kongo (2009) 
point out that
Balanced contributions property is rather a restrictive one, because the efficient value that satisfies the property is only the Shapley value. They study a weaker property than Balanced contributions property. In their weaker
property, contributions among all players are balanced in a cyclical manner and their weaker property is called the balanced cycle contributions property.
Here, we consider another new weaker property than Balanced contributions property as follows.
Balanced average contributions property: For each (N, v) ∈ G with
|N | = n ≥ 2 and any i ∈ N ,
In the above property, we focus on the average of contributions from a player to another. It requires that the average of the other players' contributions to a player is balanced with the average of the player's contributions 
The above expression is the same as the well-known recursive representation of the Shapley value (see Owen 1989 and Hart and Mas-Colell 1989 Next, we study the axiomatic characterization of the AL-value. As we discussed in the previous sections, the AL-value is closely related to the 6 Following the above arguments, the proof is obvious. Hence, we omit it.
reduced gameà la Davis and Maschler. Replacing restricted games in the above two balanced contributions properties with the lexicographically DMreduced games, we obtain the following two new properties.
Balanced DM-contributions property: For each (N, v) ∈ G C and any
Balanced average DM-contributions property: For each (N, v) ∈ G C
with |N | = n ≥ 2 and any i ∈ N ,
In the above two properties, we evaluate a player's contribution to another through the lexicographically DM-reduced games instead of restricted games. As we mentioned before, the lexicographically DM-reduced games Unlike the Shapley value, we cannot characterize the AL-value by Balanced DM-contributions property and Efficiency. Moreover, we obtain the following.
Theorem 7. There is no efficient value on G C that satisfies Balanced DMcontributions property.
Proof. By definition, if a value satisfies Balanced DM-contributions property then it also satisfies Balanced average DM-contributions property. By Theorem 6, the AL-value is the unique efficient value on G C that satisfies
Balanced average DM-contributions property. Thus, it is enough to show that the AL-value does not satisfy Balanced DM-contributions property.
Consider the following four-person game defined on N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. 
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we give two characterizations of the AL-value. One is a noncooperative characterization and the other is an axiomatic characterization.
A consistency property which we call average consistency plays an important role in the both characterizations. Together with the results in Myerson 
